Columbia Law School

Scholarship Archive
Faculty Scholarship

Faculty Publications

2008

WRTL II: The Sharpest Turn in Campaign Finance's Long and
Winding Road
Richard Briffault
Columbia Law School, brfflt@law.columbia.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Election Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Richard Briffault, WRTL II: The Sharpest Turn in Campaign Finance's Long and Winding Road, 1 ALB. GOV'T
L. REV. 101 (2008).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/3766

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For more
information, please contact scholarshiparchive@law.columbia.edu, rwitt@law.columbia.edu.

BRIFFAULT FOR PRODUCTION.DOC

1/16/2008 5:15:44 PM

WRTL II: THE SHARPEST TURN IN
CAMPAIGN FINANCE’S LONG AND
WINDING ROAD
Richard Briffault*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ....................................................................... 102
I. THE ROAD TO WRTL II..................................................... 107
II. WRTL II’S BREAK WITH MCCONNELL .............................. 113
A. The “Functional Equivalent” of Express Advocacy... 116
B. Context and Certainty ................................................ 118
C. The Burden of Regulation.......................................... 124
D. The Values at Stake in Campaign Finance
Regulation .................................................................. 127
III. LOOKING FORWARD: CAMPAIGN FINANCE
REGULATION AFTER WRTL II .......................................... 130
A. Disclosure ................................................................... 131
B. The “Public Communications” of State and Local
Political Parties.......................................................... 133
C. The Corporate and Union Treasury Fund
Restriction .................................................................. 138

101

BRIFFAULT FOR PRODUCTION.DOC

102

1/16/2008 5:15:44 PM

ALBANY GOVERNMENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 1

INTRODUCTION
In Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc.
(WRTL II), a closely divided and fragmented Supreme Court,
without a majority opinion, held that the First Amendment
requires the creation of a sweeping as-applied exception to § 203
of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA),1 which
extended the ban on the use of corporate and union treasury
funds in federal election campaigns to “electioneering
communication.”2 In so doing, the Court broke sharply with its
2003 decision in McConnell v. Federal Election Commission,
which had, inter alia, rejected a facial challenge to the
constitutionality of that BCRA provision.3 Without formally
overturning that part of McConnell or officially invalidating the
recently sustained “electioneering communication” measure,
WRTL II effectively did both.
In one sense, WRTL II fits easily within the Court’s pattern of
campaign finance decision-making. For thirty years, campaign
finance cases have been regularly marked by close decisions, lack
of agreement even within the majority, and sharp shifts in
doctrine.4 The seminal 1976 campaign finance decision in
Buckley v. Valeo was joined in full by just three of the eight
participating justices.5 Two decades later, the Court that decided
Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. Federal
Election Commission (Colorado Republican I) splintered into
three groups, with no single set of views commanding majority
support.6 A decade after that, the Court in Randall v. Sorrell
issued six separate opinions, no majority opinion, and a plurality
* Joseph P. Chamberlain Professor of Legislation, Columbia Law School;
B.A. 1974, Columbia University; J.D. 1977, Harvard Law School.
1 Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL II), 127 S. Ct.
2652, 2659 (2007).
2 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) of 2002 Pub. L. No. 107-155, §
203, 116 Stat. 89-91 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2) (2000 & Supp. IV)).
3 McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 209 (2003).
4 See Richard Briffault, WRTL and Randall: The Roberts Court and the
Unsettling of Campaign Finance Law, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 807, 807 (2007)
[hereinafter Briffault, WRTL and Randall] (discussing the different patterns of
the Supreme Court regarding campaign finance laws).
5 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 6, 235 (1976) (per curiam).
6 Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm’n
(Colorado Republican I), 518 U.S. 604, 608, 626, 648 (1996).
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opinion announcing the judgment of the Court that was signed by
just three – and, in one key part, just two – justices.7 In 1978,
the Court divided 5-4 in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,
holding that a state prohibition on corporate spending in a ballot
proposition campaign is unconstitutional.8 However, a dozen
years later, the Court split 6-3 in Austin v. Michigan State
Chamber of Commerce, holding that a state ban on corporate
spending supporting or opposing election candidates is
constitutional.9 The Supreme Court determined in Colorado
Republican I, on a 7-2 vote, that limiting party-independent
spending supporting or opposing candidates is unconstitutional.10
Just five years later followed the 5-4 vote in Federal Election
Commission v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign
Committee (Colorado Republican II), which held that a limit on
party spending coordinated with a candidate is constitutional.11
The Court’s very deferential review in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri
Government PAC, on a 6-3 vote, of state contribution limits in
2000,12 was followed in 2006 by Randall’s far more searching
review, also on a 6-3 vote, of state contribution limits.13
Moreover, the McConnell decision undermined in WRTL II itself
represented a departure from the Court’s earlier cases, notably
Buckley, concerning the proper definition of election-related
communications that may constitutionally be subject to
regulation.14
Given this history, WRTL II can be seen as just one more turn
in the long and winding campaign finance road.15 Yet, WRTL II,
and especially Chief Justice Roberts’s lead opinion, do seem
unusual, even within the campaign finance paradigm of close
division, fragmentation, and doctrinal zigzags. Unlike the other
Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479, 2485, 2500, 2501, 2506, 2511 (2006).
First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 795 (1978).
9 Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 668-69
(1990).
10 Colorado Republican I, 518 U.S. at 608.
11 Fed. Election Comm’n v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm.
(Colorado Republican II), 533 U.S. 431, 464-65 (2001).
12 Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 381 (2000).
13 Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479, 2491 (2006).
14 McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 162 (2003).
15 As Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion actually received fewer votes than
Justice Scalia’s, it cannot be referred to as the plurality opinion. Justice Scalia
repeatedly refers to the Chief Justice’s opinion as the “principal opinion.”
WRTL II, 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2683 nn.6, 7 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment). I will refer to it as the “lead” opinion as it leads
the other opinions in the published reports.
7
8
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campaign finance cases in which the Court changed direction
from the most relevant precedent, neither Chief Justice Roberts’
opinion nor Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion makes an effort to
reconcile its analysis with the prior holding. Neither opinion
sought to develop an as-applied exception that would fit within
the McConnell framework. Rather, the decision broke with
McConnell on virtually every point – not just the holding, but
also McConnell’s reasoning, assumptions, and perspective.
In some of the prior cases involving doctrinal shifts, a justice
apparently changed his or her mind; Justice Stevens, for
example, was in both the Bellotti and Austin majorities.16
Alternatively, a justice may have seen important differences in
the specific facts or restrictions at issue in different cases, as
Justice Breyer did in voting to uphold the contribution
restrictions in Nixon while later voting to strike down the
contribution limits in Randall.17 This provided an impetus for
opinions that offered rationales for holding the apparently
conflicting results in different cases together. Although these
rationales were not always persuasive – it has never been
entirely clear why limits on corporate spending can be
constitutional in the candidate setting but not in the ballot
proposition context – at least some justices made the effort. In
other cases, like McConnell, the Court justified its change in
doctrine by stressing the unsatisfactory experience with the past
precedent in practice.18 The majority justices in WRTL II,
however, made no effort to reconcile their decision with
McConnell or to cite difficulties experienced in applying
McConnell.19 The shift in doctrine was due apparently, not to
new facts or a change of mind, but solely to a change in the
membership of the Court. All the WRTL II justices who had
participated in McConnell adhered to their McConnell position,
16 First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 767 (1978); Austin v.
Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 654 (1990).
17 Shrink, 528 U.S. at 405 (Justice Breyer joined the majority opinion
upholding a Missouri statute restricting contributions ranging from $250 to
$1,000); Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2485, 2500, 2501, 2506, 2485 (Justice Breyer
authored the opinion of the court which struck down on First Amendment
grounds a Vermont campaign finance statute limiting campaign contributions).
18 See, e.g., McConnell, 540 U.S. at 126-29 (discussing the distinction
between express and issue advocacy).
19 See WRTL II, 127 S. Ct. at 2704-05 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that
no “serious argument” can be made that McConnell has been “unworkable in
practice,” and “nothing has changed about the facts” cited in McConnell to
justify that decision).
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but Justice Alito’s replacement of Justice O’Connor shifted the
balance of power within the Court concerning campaign finance
much as it has in other areas of constitutional law.20 The Scalia
group clearly had no need to demonstrate any consistency with
McConnell, a case they would overturn. Moreover, although the
Chief Justice’s opinion purported to be applying McConnell, it
made no effort to hold its analysis together with McConnell
either.
Instead, as I will indicate below, it breaks with
McConnell on virtually every important point.
As striking a feature of the WRTL II decision as the abrupt
volte-face on McConnell, is the division within the majority
between the three concurring justices who would have
overturned McConnell outright, and the two justices in the lead
opinion who voted to preserve the shell of McConnell while
eviscerating it.21
Whereas in other cases of fragmented
majorities, the different opinions within the majority reflected
different positions on questions of constitutional principle,22 the
two groups making up the WRTL II majority appear to agree
entirely on principle. Indeed, the Chief Justice struggled to
persuade Justice Scalia that the lead opinion was entirely
consistent with the values articulated by the concurrence.23 Nor,
20 See Anthony Lewis, The Court: How ‘So Few Have Quickly Changed So
Much’, 54 N.Y. REV. BOOKS 58 (No. 20, Dec. 20, 2007), available at
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/20899 (chronicling the Supreme Court’s
conservative shift during the 2006-07 term).
21 See WRTL II, 127 S. Ct. at 2687 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment, with whom Justices Kennedy and Thomas join)
(stating that they would overrule the McConnell decision, which upheld § 203 of
BCRA); id. at 2674 (finding that the McConnell decision remains intact); id.
(Alito, J., concurring) (“[I]t is unnecessary to go further and decide whether §
203 is constitutional on its face.”).
22 See, e.g., Colorado Republican I, 518 U.S. 604, 608 (1996) (striking down
Federal Election Commission limits on certain party spending; Justices Breyer,
O’Connor and Souter determined that the spending in question was
independent of any candidate, and that the Court’s prior rulings that the
Constitution bars limits on independent spending applies to party spending
too); see also id. at 630 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting
in part, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Scalia, J.) (rejecting all limits on party
spending on the theory that party spending is indistinguishable from candidate
spending and, thus, like candidate spending, may not be limited); id. at 640-41
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that all contribution and expenditure
restrictions should be invalidated).
23 WRTL II, 127 S. Ct. at 2669 n.7. In a separate concurrence, Justice
Alito, who joined the Chief Justice’s opinion, appeared to signal that he was
ready to join Justice Scalia and overturn McConnell in a future case. Id. at
2674. As WRTL II asked only for an as-applied exception, Justice Alito deemed
it “unnecessary to go further and decide” whether the electioneering
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although his opinion regularly cited McConnell, did the Chief
Justice ever suggest that McConnell was correctly decided.
Apparently, the sole difference dividing the lead from the
concurring opinion was a tactical reluctance to overrule a
precedent outright – what Justice Scalia sarcastically labeled the
lead opinion’s “faux judicial restraint.”24
Yet, whether it
acknowledged the effect or not, the lead opinion, like the
concurrence, overruled McConnell. Indeed, this is the first time,
despite all the prior doctrinal zigs and zags, that the Court has
actually overturned a campaign finance precedent.25
One particularly ironic result of the lead opinion’s
disinclination to formally overrule McConnell is that although a
central theme in both the Roberts and Scalia opinions is the need
for clear rules to avoid chilling constitutionally protected speech,
WRTL II produces a definition of constitutionally regulable
“electioneering communication” that is far more vague and
uncertain than the one upheld in McConnell, or than the earlier
Buckley “express advocacy” standard which McConnell
supplanted.26
At the very least, WRTL II is an unusually sharp and jolting
curve in the campaign finance road. It could be a harbinger of
more dramatic changes in the years to come. Or, if enough of the
Court’s campaign finance skeptics continue to be both hostile to
earlier decisions yet averse to formally overruling those
decisions, campaign finance doctrine could become even more
complex and internally inconsistent than it is today.
This article provides a brief analysis of WRTL II, with
particular attention to Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion announcing
the judgment of the Court. Part II frames the case against the
quarter-century effort from Buckley to BCRA and McConnell to
define the constitutionally permissible scope of campaign finance
communication provision is “unconstitutional on its face.” Id. He then observed
“we will presumably be asked in a future case to reconsider the holding in
McConnell.” Id.
24 Id. at 2684 n.7 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
25 See id. (“[T]he change in the law [the Roberts opinion] works is
substantial enough, that seven Justices of this Court, having widely divergent
views concerning the constitutionality of the restrictions at issue, agree that the
opinion effectively overrules McConnell without saying so.”); WRTL II, 127 S.
Ct. at 2704 (Souter, J., dissenting ) (“There is neither a theoretical nor a
practical basis to claim that McConnell’s treatment of § 203 [the ban on
corporate and union electioneering communication] survives.”).
26 Id. at 2695-96 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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regulation, that is, in language I have previously used, to “draw
the elections/politics line.”27 Part III focuses on WRTL II’s
relationship to McConnell, and its departures in analysis and
tone from the major components of McConnell’s approach.
Finally, Part IV considers the implications of WRTL II for the
future development of campaign finance law. WRTL II continues
the process, begun during the preceding Term, of changing the
Court’s stance toward campaign finance regulation from relative
deference to sharp skepticism,28 and it raises new questions
about older rulings, including other components of McConnell. It
is not clear that WRTL II ‘s break from McConnell can be cabined
to the treatment of corporate and union electioneering
communication. On the other hand, Chief Justice Roberts’
reluctance, so far, to actually overturn precedents renders the
future of campaign finance law more unpredictable and
uncertain than ever.
I. THE ROAD TO WRTL II
One of the most difficult questions in campaign finance law is
the definition of election-related activity. The Supreme Court
has repeatedly upheld regulations in the campaign context –
mandatory disclosure of contributions and expenditures,29
limitations on contributions,30 prohibitions on the use of
corporate and union treasury funds to make campaign
contributions and expenditures31 – that would surely be
unconstitutional if applied to political activity more broadly.32 As
the Court has explained, it is not that these practices are any less
burdensome for constitutionally protected speech and association
rights in the electoral context; rather, the electoral setting

27 See generally Richard Briffault, Issue Advocacy: Redrawing the
Elections/Politics Line, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1751 (1999) [hereinafter Briffault, Issue
Advocacy] (discussing the need to draw a line between political spending and
election campaign spending).
28 See generally Briffault, WRTL and Randall, supra note 4 (discussing
how the first term of the Roberts Court marked a “pivotal moment in campaign
finance law”).
29 See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 60-84 (1976) (per curiam).
30 See, e.g., id. at 35.
31 See Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 659-60
(1990); Fed. Election Comm’n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 162 n.8 (2003).
32 See Austin, 494 U.S. at 666 (noting that statutes must be narrowly
construed so as not to infringe on constitutional rights).
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provides special justifications for these regulations.33 Thus, the
importance of an informed electorate has been cited in upholding
disclosure requirements,34 while the constitutionally compelling
concerns of preventing corruption and the appearance of
corruption have been held to justify disclosure,35 contribution
limits,36 and the special restrictions on corporate and union
treasury funds.37 The sharply different treatment of electoral
and non-electoral activity, however, requires criteria for
distinguishing between these closely connected, if not
overlapping, means of pursuing political goals. It might be easy
to classify most spending by candidates as election-related, but
the issue is far trickier when applied to political parties, and
politically active individuals, organizations, and groups that
engage in both electoral and non-electoral activities.
In Buckley, the Court, focusing on the constitutional
imperatives of avoiding both vagueness and overbreadth, adopted
“express advocacy” as the criterion for the regulation of noncandidates.38 As the Court explained, the “express advocacy”
definition of election-relatedness would “restrict the application”
of the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) to
“communications containing express words of advocacy of
election or defeat, such as ‘vote for,’ ‘elect,’ ‘support,’ ‘cast your
ballot for,’ ‘Smith for Congress,’ ‘vote against,’ ‘defeat,’ ‘reject.’”39
This became known as the “‘magic words’” test.40 Political
advertising by individuals, organizations, and groups that
avoided use of the magic words of express advocacy – speech that
became known as “issue advocacy” – was exempt from
regulation.41
By the 1990s, the “express advocacy” requirement had become
33 See Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 156-57 (giving deference to congressional
judgment that corporate contributions pose dangers to the electoral process).
34 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66-68 (providing three governmental interests
served by disclosure requirements).
35 Id. at 67.
36 Id. at 68.
37 See Austin, 494 U.S. at 659-60 (recognizing that there are special
dangers of corruption when corporate and union funds are used to influence
elections).
38 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 45.
39 Id. at 44 n.52.
40 See Briffault, Issue Advocacy, supra note 27, at 1755 (noting that lower
courts assumed that the First Amendment prohibited any attempt at regulating
political spending that did not use Buckley’s “‘magic words’ of express
advocacy”).
41 Id. at 1752, 1754-55.
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an easy escape hatch for most electorally active groups. Political
parties, interest groups, and campaign specialists had little
difficulty producing ads that effectively promoted or opposed
federal candidates while eschewing the magic words of express
advocacy.42 One legally-validated technique was the use of ads
that sharply criticized a candidate with respect to an election
issue, but then included a tag line providing the sponsor’s
telephone number and making a request that the viewer call the
sponsor for more information, or providing the criticized
candidate’s number and urging the viewer to call the candidate
and “tell him what you think.”43 By advocating an action other
than voting, these ads evaded the express advocacy label and
became constitutionally protected issue advocacy.44 By the 2000
election more than $500 million was being spent on such issue
ads.45
Closing the issue advocacy loophole, and thereby preventing
easy evasion of FECA’s disclosure requirements and restrictions
on the use of corporate and union treasury funds, was one of the
driving forces behind BCRA.46 Mindful of the Court’s concerns of
vagueness and overbreadth, Congress created a new category of
“‘electioneering communication’” consisting of (i) “broadcast,
cable, or satellite communications” that (ii) refer “to a clearly
identified candidate for federal office,” (iii) are aired within sixty
days before a general election or thirty days before a primary
election, and (iv) are targeted at the candidate’s constituency.47

McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 126 (2003).
Id. at 127.
44 See Briffault, Issue Advocacy, supra note 27, at 1759-60 (stating that by
creatively combining criticism of a candidate with encouragement to call the
candidate criticized to inquire about an issue, ads can protect themselves from
being labeled “express advocacy”).
45 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 128 n.20 (citing KATHLEEN HALL JAMIESON ET AL.,
ANNENBERG PUB. POLICY CTR. OF THE UNIV. OF PA., ISSUE ADVERTISING IN THE
1999-2000 ELECTION CYCLE 1-15 (2001)).
46 Id. at 129-30, 133; see also COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS,
INVESTIGATION OF ILLEGAL OR IMPROPER ACTIVITIES IN CONNECTION WITH 1996
FEDERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGNS, S. Rep. No. 105-167, Vol. 3, at 4535 (2d Sess.
1998) (noting the need for new legislation to close soft money and issue
advocacy loopholes); see also id. Vol. 5, at 4611 (“The most insidious problem
with the campaign finance system involved soft (unrestricted) money raised by
both parties. The soft-money loophole, though legal, led to a meltdown of the
campaign finance system that was designed to keep corporate, union and large
individual contributions from influencing the electoral process.”).
47 BCRA, 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A)(i)(I)-(III) (Supp. V 2005); McConnell, 540
U.S. at 190 n.73.
42
43
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In case the Court determined that this definition reached too
broadly, Congress added a “backup” definition that would apply if
the principal definition were invalidated.48
This backup
definition was also aimed at broadcast and cable and satellite
ads, but it discarded the temporal component of the main
definition and instead limited itself to ads that promote, attack,
support, or oppose a candidate and are “suggestive of no
plausible meaning other than an exhortation to vote for or
against a specific candidate.”49
McConnell considered a facial challenge to most of BCRA’s
provisions, including the new category of “electioneering
communication.”50 The Court upheld most of BCRA including, in
particular, its extension of the corporate and union expenditure
restriction from magic-words-style express advocacy to
“electioneering communication.”51 Looking to the development of
the issue advocacy loophole and the practical impact of issue ads
on campaigns,52 the record before Congress,53 and the expert
evidence presented to, and the findings of the district court,54 the
McConnell majority determined that “the issue ads broadcast
during the 30- and 60-day periods preceding federal primary and
general elections are the functional equivalent of express
advocacy.”55 McConnell distinguished Buckley by finding that its
adoption of the “magic words” definition of express advocacy was
simply an effort to deal with the vagueness of the 1974 FECA
Amendments’ definition of election-related activity and was thus,
“specific to the statutory language before us” in that case.56 It
was “an endpoint of statutory interpretation, not a first principle

2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A)(ii).
Id.
50 See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 189-90 (discussing plaintiffs’ challenge to
“electioneering communication” provision).
51 See id. at 207 (finding that even if the BCRA might inhibit some
constitutionally protected speech, this still wouldn’t be enough to “‘justify
prohibiting all enforcement’” of the law) (quoting Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S.
113, 120 (2003)).
52 See id. at 126-30 (highlighting examples of the many ways interest
groups and others circumvented the restrictions).
53 See id. at 131-32 (summarizing the findings of the 1998 report by the
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs).
54 Id. at 193-94, 196-97.
55 Id. at 206; see also McConnell, 540 U.S. at 126 (“While the distinction
between ‘issue’ and express advocacy seemed neat in theory, the two categories
of advertisements proved functionally identical in important respects.”).
56 Id. at 192.
48
49
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of constitutional law.”57
“In narrowly reading the FECA
provisions in Buckley to avoid problems of vagueness and
overbreadth, we nowhere suggested that a statute that was
neither vague nor overbroad would be required to toe the same
express advocacy line.”58
The McConnell majority found that the BCRA definition
avoided the Charybdis and Scylla of vagueness and
overbreadth.59 Its components “are both easily understood and
objectively determinable,”60 and therefore not vague. As for
overbreadth, while the majority recognized that some broadcast
ads that air in the pre-election periods and refer to clearly
identified candidates might have “no electioneering purpose,” it
concluded that “the vast majority of ads clearly had such a
purpose.”61 Whether “in an absolute sense or relative to its
application to election-related advertising, the record strongly
supports the conclusion” that BCRA’s regulation of nonelectioneering, or “true” issue ads, is not substantial.62 The Court
further minimized the overbreadth problem by pointing out that
“whatever the precise percentage” of “true” issue ads in the
category of electioneering communication in the past, “in the
future corporations and unions may finance genuine issue ads
during those timeframes by simply avoiding any specific
reference to federal candidates, or in doubtful cases by paying for
the ad from a segregated fund,”63 that is, from the corporation’s
or union’s political action committee (PAC) which, unlike
corporate or union treasury funds, is not subject to the
expenditure prohibition.
McConnell appeared to settle the authority of Congress to
redefine the scope of campaign finance regulation in light of the
realities of modern electoral campaigns. But a little more than a
half-year after the decision was handed down, Wisconsin Right to
Id. at 190.
Id. at 192.
59 Id.
60 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 194.
61 Id. at 206; see also BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE AT NYU SCHOOL OF LAW,
BUYING TIME 2000: TELEVISION ADVERTISING IN THE 2000 FEDERAL ELECTIONS 73
(2001),
available
at
http://www.brennancenter.org/stack_detail.asp?
key=97&subkey=10675 (select hyperlink for “Chapter 8: Closing the Loopholes:
Assessing the Impact of Reform”) (“Of all group-sponsored issue ads that
depicted a candidate within 60 days of the election, 99.4% were found to be
electioneering issue ads.”).
62 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 207.
63 Id. at 206.
57
58
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Life, Inc. (WRTL), an incorporated right-to-life organization,
which accepts contributions from business corporations, began
the process that would culminate in the undoing of McConnell.64
In July 2004, WRTL aired ads calling on Wisconsinites to contact
their two senators, Russell Feingold and Herbert Kohl, to urge
them to oppose the filibustering of President Bush’s judicial
nominations.65 With Senator Feingold running for reelection in
2004, the ads fell within BCRA’s definition of electioneering
communications on August 15 – thirty days before the September
primary.66 With the sixty-day general election blackout period
starting even before the primary blackout ended, WRTL’s ads
could not be broadcast again until after the November general
election unless WRTL chose to pay for the ads from its PAC or it
chose to delete the specific reference to Senator Feingold.67
Asserting that the ads were “grass-roots lobbying” aimed at
influencing the senators’ votes and not Senator Feingold’s
reelection, WRTL contended the ads were constitutionally
immune from restriction and entitled to an “as-applied” exception
from BCRA.68 The district court initially dismissed the case,
holding that McConnell’s statement that it had upheld “all
applications” of BCRA’s electioneering communication definition
foreclosed an as-applied exception.69 Moreover, the district court
suggested that even if an as-applied exception were available in
theory it would probably not protect the WRTL ad as WRTL was
actively involved in opposing Senator Feingold’s reelection.70 The
organization’s PAC had endorsed candidates opposed to Senator
Feingold, and those candidates had made Feingold’s support of
judicial filibusters a campaign issue.71
In January 2006, in the final days of Justice O’Connor’s tenure,
a unanimous Supreme Court reversed the district court.72 In a
64 See generally Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, No. 041260, 2004 WL 3622736, at *1 (D.D.C. Aug. 17, 2004) (describing WRTL’s
complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief declaring portions of the
BCRA unconstitutional and unenforceable against it).
65 Id. at *2 (exhibits A, B, and C contain the text of the disputed
advertisements).
66 Id.
67 Id. at *2, *4.
68 Id. at *2.
69 Id.
70 Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 2004 WL 3622736, at *3.
71 Id.
72 Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v. Fed. Election Comm’n (WRTL I), 546 U.S. 410,
411 (2006).
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four-paragraph opinion, Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. v. Federal
Election Commission (WRTL I), the Court held that McConnell
had considered only a facial challenge to BCRA so that the
district court had erred in finding that McConnell precluded an
as-applied challenge.73 The WRTL I oral argument indicates that
the Court’s terse disposition masked a deep, underlying
disagreement concerning the proper scope of campaign finance
regulation – a disagreement which tracked the division in
McConnell two years earlier.74 In questioning WRTL’s lawyer,
most of the members of the McConnell majority contended that
McConnell had resolved the issue.75 The McConnell dissenters,
led by Chief Justice Roberts who was then new to the Court,
replacing McConnell-dissenter Chief Justice Rehnquist,
emphasized the First Amendment issues at stake.76 In the end,
Justice O’Connor, who had co-authored the McConnell majority
opinion, may have provided the formula for resolving the case
before her impending departure from the Court when she
observed, “[w]ell, I suppose you can say, yes, you can have an asapplied challenge, but this one doesn’t meet the test.”77
Accordingly, WRTL I concluded that McConnell had not
foreclosed WRTL’s as-applied challenge, but it said nothing about
the requirements for an as-applied challenge to succeed, nor
anything about whether WRTL was likely to prevail on the
merits.78 Instead, it remanded the case to the district court.79
The issue returned to the Court a year later – with Justice
O’Connor replaced by Justice Alito – in WRTL II.80
II. WRTL II’S BREAK WITH MCCONNELL
WRTL II held, 5-4, that WRTL had a constitutionally protected
right to run its anti-filibuster ads.81 More precisely, WRTL was
entitled to use funds that came from business corporations to pay
for the ads, to clearly identify a federal candidate in the ads, and

Id. at 411-12.
Briffault, WRTL and Randall, supra note 4, at 814.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 815.
77 Transcript of Oral Argument at *29, WRTL I, 546 U.S. 410 (2006) (No.
04-1581).
78 Briffault, WRTL and Randall, supra note 4, at 815-16.
79 WRTL I, 546 U.S. at 412.
80 WRTL II, 127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007).
81 Id. at 2673.
73
74
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to run the ads in the candidate’s constituency in the pre-election
period, notwithstanding BCRA’s prohibition.82 The seven justices
who had been on the Court when McConnell was decided voted
as they had in McConnell.83 Justice Scalia, joined by Justice
Thomas and Justice Kennedy, contended, as they had in
McConnell, that the BCRA provision banning corporate and
union treasury fund spending on electioneering communication
was unconstitutional.84 They saw no need to create an as-applied
exception for WRTL.85 Indeed, in their view any as-applied
exception was likely to be unacceptably vague and unworkable in
practice.86
They concluded that the only constitutionally
acceptable solution was to overturn McConnell and return to
Buckley’s express advocacy/magic words standard.87 Justice
Souter, in an opinion joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and
Breyer – the remaining members of the McConnell majority –
found that the WRTL ads fell exactly within the mainstream of
the category of ads that were “issue” in form but electioneering in
substance that had been the focus of Congress in enacting BCRA
and of McConnell in sustaining it.88 Without articulating their
own criteria for what types of ads ought to obtain an as-applied
exception, they would have denied one to WRTL. In so doing, the
four dissenters reaffirmed their commitment to McConnell’s
holding.89
With the more senior justices locked into their previous
positions, the decision turned on the views of the two justices
who had joined the Court after McConnell: Chief Justice Roberts,
who announced the judgment of the Court, and Justice Alito, the
only justice who joined the Roberts opinion.90 Without directly
questioning McConnell’s authority, and, indeed, while repeatedly
invoking McConnell,91 the Chief Justice and Justice Alito
concluded that the First Amendment requires the creation of a
Id. at 2658-74.
Id. at 2657; McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 113 (2003).
84 WRTL II, 127 S. Ct. at 2679 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
85 See id. at 2687.
86 See id. at 2685 (stating that an “administrable as-applied” exception is
“illusory”).
87 Id. at 2684.
88 Id. at 2687, 2698-99 (Souter, J., dissenting).
89 Id. at 2687.
90 WRTL II, 127 S. Ct at 2658.
Justice Alito also authored a brief
concurrence. Id. at 2674.
91 See, e.g., id. at 2659, 2664-65, 2668.
82
83
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capacious as-applied exception, which WRTL’s ads easily fell
within.92 Despite its nominal fealty to McConnell, the Roberts
opinion’s standard for obtaining an as-applied exception is so
broad, however, that it effectively invalidates the BCRA
provision it contends it is not disturbing – as the other seven
justices recognized in their concurring and dissenting opinions.93
Indeed, the Roberts opinion’s standard is virtually identical to
BCRA’s “backup definition” which was to come into effect only if
the primary definition of electioneering communication was
invalidated.94
In effect, the Court reversed McConnell,
invalidated the primary electioneering communication definition,
and upheld the back-up definition sub silentio. Yet, Chief Justice
Roberts’s pivotal opinion left McConnell in place even as it
stripped it of constitutional significance.
Although the Roberts opinion purported to rely on McConnell
and repeatedly cited the earlier opinion, the Chief Justice’s
opinion was inconsistent with McConnell in at least four
significant ways in addition to its outcome. First, it disregarded
McConnell’s recognition that most so-called issue advocacy is the
“functional equivalent” of express advocacy, so that the
justifications for regulating express advocacy apply to such issue
ads as well. Similarly, it rejected McConnell’s determination
that the electoral context plays a key role in deciding whether an
ad constitutes regulable election-related speech. Third, it treated
the burden BCRA § 203 places on corporate and union
participation in electoral politics as far more severe than
McConnell had recognized. Lastly, and most fundamentally, it
articulated a very different understanding of the values at stake
in campaign finance regulation.

Id. at 2673.
See id. at 2683 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (“[A]ny clear rule that would protect all genuine issue ads would
cover such a substantial number of ads prohibited by [BCRA] § 203 that [BCRA]
§ 203 would be rendered substantially overbroad.”) (emphasis in original); see
id. at 2704 (Souter, J., dissenting ) (“[T]he principal opinion institute[s] the very
standard that would have prevailed if the Court formally overruled . . .
McConnell’s treatment of [BCRA] § 203.”).
94 See WRTL II, 127 S. Ct at 2680 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (explaining that Chief Justice Roberts’s test
“bear[s] a strong likeness to BCRA’s backup definition.”); see also id. at 2704
(Souter, J., dissenting) (explaining that BCRA’s backup definition “is essentially
identical to the Chief Justice’s test for evaluating an as-applied challenge to the
original definition of ‘electioneering communication.’”).
92
93
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A. The “Functional Equivalent” of Express Advocacy
The Chief Justice’s opinion begins with McConnell’s
recognition that in the years before BCRA’s enactment most socalled issue advocacy advertising was the “functional equivalent”
of express advocacy.95 McConnell saw the emergence of issue ads
as the response of creative political operatives to Buckley’s
express advocacy test.96 The McConnell Court recognized that
ads could have electoral significance even if they lacked the
magic words of express advocacy and even if their terms
appeared to address issues not electoral outcomes; indeed,
McConnell pointed out that like most modern commercial
advertising, the ads were likely to be more effective because they
“avoid the use of the magic words” of advocacy.97 Such ads were
the “functional equivalent” of or “functionally identical” to
express advocacy not because they were linguistically or
syntactically similar to express advocacy ads but because they
had the same function – to affect elections.98 As the Constitution
permits the regulation of express advocacy, McConnell reasoned,
it permits the regulation of the functional equivalent – broadcast
ads that mention a candidate and that are aired to the
candidate’s constituency in the defined pre-election period.99
Chief Justice Roberts, however, turned McConnell’s use of the
“functional equivalent” phrase on its ear, converting it from an
expansive term intended to capture the creativity of
contemporary election advertising to a rule of limitation that

95 Id. at 2659 (stating that the Court has “long recognized that the
distinction between campaign advocacy and issue advocacy ‘may often dissolve
in practical application.’”) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 42 (1976)).
96 See McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 126 (2003)
(explaining that since this Court in Buckley “construed FECA’s disclosure and
reporting requirements, as well as its expenditure limitations, ‘to reach only
funds used for communications that expressly advocate the election or defeat of
a clearly identified candidate’ political operatives simply used or omitted “magic
words” to place the same communication into the category of “issue advocacy.”)
(quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 80).
97 Id. at 127.
98 See id. at 126, 206 (explaining that express advocacy ads and issue
advocacy ads are both “used to advocate the election and defeat of clearly
identified federal candidates,” and they both have the effect of “influenc[ing]
voters’ decisions,” “even though the so-called issue ads eschewed the use of
magic words.”).
99 See id. at 127 (explaining that the fact that issue ads “were specifically
intended to affect election results was confirmed by the fact that almost all of
them were aired in 60 days immediately preceding a federal election.”).
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would push electioneering back to express advocacy. For Chief
Justice Roberts, an ad is the functional equivalent of express
advocacy only if it is the linguistic equivalent of an express ad.100
As he put it, an ad is the functional equivalent of express
advocacy “only if the ad is susceptible of no reasonable
interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a
specific candidate.”101 Any ad which discusses both issues and
candidates and avoids an appeal to vote for or against a
candidate is “susceptible” of a “reasonable interpretation” that it
is not an appeal to vote for or against a candidate. Thus, even if
the ad is broadcast in the pre-election period by an electorally
active organization and it names a candidate, it is not the
functional equivalent of express advocacy and is entitled to an asapplied exemption from BCRA. This resurrects the “magic
words” test, albeit without the specific magic words requirement.
The shift in the meaning of functional equivalence from
McConnell to WRTL II is perhaps best seen by considering how
the Roberts test would apply to the hypothetical “Jane Doe” ad,
which the McConnell Court gave as Exhibit A of the need to
extend the definition of regulable campaign speech from “express
advocacy” to BCRA’s “electioneering communication.”102 As the
Court in McConnell explained, “[l]ittle difference exist[s], for
example, between an ad that urged viewers to ‘vote against Jane
Doe’ and one that condemned Jane Doe’s record on a particular
issue before exhorting viewers to ‘call Jane Doe and tell her what
you think.’”103 Yet, under the Chief Justice’s test, it could be
argued that the second Jane Doe ad is exactly what it nominally
purports to be – an effort to persuade viewers to call Jane Doe
and get her to change her vote on a pending issue. As the Chief
Justice put it, the WRTL ads qualified for the as-applied
exception because “[t]he ads focus on a legislative issue, take a
position on the issue, exhort the public to adopt that position,
and urge the public to contact public officials with respect to that
matter.”104
To be sure, at one point the Chief Justice notes that the Jane

WRTL II, 127 S. Ct. at 2667.
Id.
102 See id. at 2667 (comparing and contrasting the Jane Doe ad in
McConnell with the three ads at issue in WRTL II).
103 McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 126-27 (2003).
104 WRTL II, 127 S. Ct. at 2667.
100
101
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Doe ad “‘condemned Jane Doe’s record on a particular issue,’”105
unlike WRTL’s ads, which refrained from literal condemnation of
Senator Feingold.106 But nothing in the Chief Justice’s formal
test for the as-applied exception precludes an exemption for ads
that contain language criticizing or praising a candidate.
Roberts’s only requirement is that the ad be “susceptible of no
other reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote
for or against a specific candidate.”107 Surely, an ad that
criticizes a senator’s position on an issue and then urges voters to
contact her to get her to change her mind is “susceptible” of the
“reasonable interpretation” that it is aimed at influencing her
Senate vote rather than the public’s vote in an upcoming election.
On Roberts’s own terms, the ad condemning Jane Doe, which was
so central to McConnell’s case for the constitutionality of the
regulation of electioneering communication, is entitled to a
constitutional exemption.108
B. Context and Certainty
Roberts’s WRTL II opinion breaks with McConnell in its
treatment of the role of context in determining whether an ad
can be regulated. The heart of McConnell was that the electoral
context is crucial in assessing whether an ad is sufficiently
election-related that the special justifications for regulating
electoral activity apply.109 McConnell gave great weight to the
impact of proven campaign practices in the determination of legal
standards.
According to the McConnell Court, Buckley’s
distinction between express advocacy and issue advocacy
“seemed neat in theory”110 but was effectively undermined by the

105 Id. at 2667 n.6 (quoting a statement made by Justice Souter in his
dissenting opinion).
106 Id. (“WRTL’s ads . . . take a position on the filibuster issue and exhort
constituents to contact Senators Feingold and Kohl to advance that position.”).
107 Id.
108 Id. at 2684 n.7 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (Roberts’s test “would apparently protect even McConnell’s
paradigmatic example of the functional equivalent of express advocacy – the socalled ‘Jane Doe ad.’”).
109 See McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 126 (2003)
(explaining that issue and express advocacy were both used to advance “the
election or defeat a clearly identified federal candidates.”).
110 Id. (“While the distinction between ‘issue’ and express advocacy seemed
neat in theory, the two categories of advertisements proved functionally
identical in important respects.”).
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development of electoral ads that eschewed the language of
express advocacy.111 McConnell looked to the statements of
officeholders, candidates, interest group advocates, corporate
executives, campaign strategists, and political scientists in the
district court’s record to find that these ads, when “aired in the
60 days immediately preceding a federal election” are
“specifically intended to affect election results” and are “the most
effective campaign ads.”112 In upholding BCRA § 203, McConnell
considered both the electoral purpose of the sponsors and the
likely electoral effect of the ads, with the timing of the ads –
“those relatively brief preelection timespans” – as well as the
language naming specific candidates critical for determining both
purpose and impact.113
Chief Justice Roberts dismissed the significance of intent,
effect, and context.114 He explained that intent and effect are
“amorphous considerations” that would inject constitutionally
unacceptable uncertainty into the determination of whether an
ad is statutorily proscribed or constitutionally protected.115 “No
reasonable speaker would choose to run an ad covered by BCRA
if its only defense to a criminal prosecution would be that its
motives were pure.”116 An effects test would provide no greater
security, as “[i]t would also typically lead to a burdensome,
expert-driven inquiry, with an indeterminate result.”117 Context
was generally problematic because of the danger that it would
“become an excuse for discovery or a broader inquiry” that due to
its costs and uncertainty “raises First Amendment concerns.”118
In assessing whether an ad qualifies for the as-applied exception,
“there generally should be no discovery or inquiry into . . .
‘contextual’ factors.”119

Id.
Id. at 127.
113 Id. at 206.
114 See WRTL II, 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2669 n.7 (2007) (dismissing both the
intent-and-effect test and the inquiry into “contextual factors”).
115 Id. at 2666 (explaining that in order to protect freedom of speech “the
proper standard for an as-applied challenge to BCRA § 203 must be objective,
focusing on the substance of the communication rather than amorphous
considerations of intent and effect.”) (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 43-44
(1976) (per curiam)).
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Id. at 2669.
119 Id. at 2669 n.7 (confronting Justice Scalia’s concerns regarding the
vagueness of the majority’s test).
111
112
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It is difficult to see how a court can determine the “reasonable
interpretation” of an ad, as Chief Justice Roberts requires,
without giving some attention to context.120 As Justice Kennedy
once observed, “[s]peech has the capacity to convey complex
substance, yielding various insights and interpretations
depending upon the identity of the listener or reader and the
context of its transmission.”121 Justice Scalia, in his WRTL II
concurrence, was also comfortable imputing a “purpose” to
WRTL’s sponsorship of the anti-filibuster ads and in drawing on
the political “context” to determine the “fair import” of the ads.122
Even Chief Justice Roberts acknowledged that courts can
consider “basic background information that may be necessary to
put an ad in context – such as whether an ad ‘describes a
legislative issue that is either currently the subject of legislative
scrutiny or likely to be the subject of such scrutiny in the near
future’” – although he rejected any broader use of context.123
Words take on meaning in context, yet the Chief Justice’s opinion
would prevent most attention to context in assessing the
meaning of a pre-election ad.
Ironically, although the Chief Justice’s principal argument for
eschewing consideration of context is the need to avoid
uncertainty and the costs of litigation, his approach of creating
an as-applied exception rather than overruling McConnell has
the result of producing a test for the scope of election-regulation
that is more vague and uncertain than either the statutory test
120 See Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of
Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1507 (2000)
(“Interpretation is a matter of making sense of the speech or action in its
context.”).
121 Fla. Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 636 (1995) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting); see also Dolan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481, 486 (2006) (stating
that statutory interpretation “depends upon reading the whole statutory text,
considering the purpose and context of the statute, and consulting any
precedents or authorities that inform the analysis.”) (emphasis added); Howard
Delivery Serv., Inc. v. Zurich American Ins. Co., 126 S. Ct. 2105, 2120 (2006)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“The definition of a term in one statute does not
necessarily control the interpretation of that term in another statute, for where
the purposes or contexts are different the terms may take on different
meanings.”).
122 WRTL II, 127 S. Ct. at 2684 n.8 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (“The purpose of the ad was to put political
pressure upon Senator Feingold to change his position on the filibuster-not only
through the constituents who accepted the invitation to contact him, but also
through the very existence of an ad bringing to the public’s attention that he,
Senator Feingold, stood athwart the allowance of a vote on judicial nominees.”).
123 Id. at 2669 (quoting the district court opinion).
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upheld in McConnell itself or Buckley’s earlier magic words
standard. WRTL II does not limit regulation to the magic words
of express advocacy.124
Presumably some electioneering
communications that do not use the magic words are still subject
to BCRA’s restriction, otherwise all ads would fall within the asapplied exception.
WRTL II’s standard for an as-applied
exemption is that the ad be “susceptible” to a “reasonable
interpretation” other than as a call to vote for or against a
candidate.125 But how can a sponsor of an ad, run during the
immediate pre-election period, that combines discussion of an
issue with sharp criticism of a candidate be sure that the Federal
Election Commission (FEC) or a court will find that issue
advocacy, and not electioneering, is a reasonable interpretation of
the ad?
The Chief Justice’s opinion compounds the uncertainty with its
justification of why WRTL’s ads were entitled to an as-applied
exception.
Instead of simply stating that the ads were
“susceptible” to the “reasonable interpretation” that their goal
was to persuade viewers to influence Senator Feingold’s position
on judicial filibusters, the Chief Justice stressed that “[t]he ads
focus on a legislative issue, take a position on the issue, . . . do
not mention an election, candidacy, political party, or challenger;
and . . . do not take a position on a candidate’s character,
qualifications, or fitness for office.”126 In other words, in the
effort to show that WRTL’s exception is an easy case, the Chief
Justice may have provided the FEC or other proponents of
regulation with an argument for denying an exemption in a case
in which the advertisement mentions a candidacy or criticizes a
candidate. But given the Chief Justice’s articulated standard for
an exemption, would it have made a difference if the WRTL ads
expressly criticized Senator Feingold’s position on the filibuster
issue, criticized his record of voting on filibusters, or had urged
voters to take the filibuster question into account in the
upcoming election?
In the notorious Bill Yellowtail ad, discussed in McConnell, the
sponsors criticized a Montana congressional candidate for
“‘preach[ing] family values’” but hitting his wife.127 The tag line
124 See id. at 2669 n.7 (discussing the Court’s use of the “magic words” of
express advocacy in Buckley).
125 Id. at 2667.
126 Id.
127 McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 194 n.78 (2003).
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urged viewers to “‘[c]all Bill Yellowtail. Tell him to support
family values.’”128 This ad did not mention an election, party or
candidacy, although it did mention a challenger, Yellowtail; it
criticized a candidate’s character; and its not clear whether it
took a position on a legislative issue, since it is not clear whether
“family values,” untethered to a particular legislative measure, is
a legislative issue. It contained sharp criticism of a candidate
and did not mention a specific legislative proposal. It was much
less issue-oriented than the WRTL ads and was, arguably, the
functional equivalent of express advocacy. Certainly the five
justices in the McConnell majority, who wrote that “[t]he notion
that this advertisement was designed purely to discuss the issue
of family values strains credulity,” thought so.129 Yet, applying
the Chief Justice’s standard of “no reasonable interpretation,”
and his commitment to rejecting the electoral context, is it
completely clear that there is no reasonable interpretation that
this is about issues?
Justice Scalia found that the Chief Justice’s standard “at least
arguably protects” the Yellowtail ad.130 If that ad is protected,
then the category of corporate and union electioneering
communications subject to BCRA’s proscription is probably a null
set. The as-applied exception would vacuum out all the cases
from the statute, notwithstanding McConnell’s finding that the
“vast majority” of ads covered by the electioneering
communication provision were actually electioneering ads.131 On
the other hand, if the Yellowtail ad is subject to regulation, then
the Chief Justice’s standard has surely increased the amount of
vagueness in this area, with corporations, labor unions, the FEC
and the courts condemned to crafting standards for sorting out
the WRTL ads from the Yellowtail ads, and working out what to
do about the thousands of ads between these polar extremes.
Indeed, Justice Scalia – no friend of BCRA – would only go so far
as to say that the Chief Justice’s standard “arguably” protects
ads like the Yellowtail ad.132 If an ad is arguably protected, then
it is also arguably not protected.

Id.
Id.
130 WRTL II, 127 S. Ct. at 2684 n.7 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
131 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 206.
132 WRTL II, 127 S. Ct. at 2684 n.7 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
128
129
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The Chief Justice’s test closely resembles the test adopted by
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit two
decades ago in Federal Election Commission v. Furgatch, when it
sought to expand the scope of regulable election-related
advertising beyond the limitations of the magic words test.133
Furgatch, like WRTL II, found that a message could be deemed
express advocacy, even without the magic words, so long as it is
“susceptible of no other reasonable interpretation but as an
exhortation to vote.”134 However, unlike in WRTL II, the court in
Furgatch determined that context, particularly the timing of the
ad relative to the election, was “relevant to a determination of
express advocacy.”135 In fact, the Furgatch court gave great
weight to the fact that the ad ran just days before the upcoming
election.136
The Furgatch ruling was codified in an FEC
regulation, and it is clearly the source of BCRA’s backup
definition of electioneering communication, as well as the Chief
Justice’ standard for an as-applied exception.137 However, during
the period between the Furgatch decision and McConnell,
virtually every federal court that considered the express
advocacy/issue advocacy question rejected Furgatch for
introducing unacceptable vagueness, and the concomitant
chilling effect on speech, into the regulation of campaign
spending.138
In effectively overruling McConnell, the Chief Justice’s opinion
does not return the law to Buckley’s magic words test, but leaves
it at Furgatch, albeit without Furgatch’s attention to timing and
context. This might modestly increase the constitutionally
permissible scope of regulation compared with the pre-BCRA era,
although it is not certain that it does. What is clear is that an
opinion which rejects context in the name of certainty has
embraced a vague and uncertain standard.

133 Fed. Election Comm’n v. Furgatch, 807 F.2d 857, 860 (9th Cir. 1987)
(“The test is whether or not the advertisement contains a message advocating
the defeat of a political candidate,” however, the “words contained in the
advertisement [are] not determinative.”).
134 Id. at 864.
135 Id. at 863, 865.
136 See id. at 865 (“Timing the appearance of the advertisement less than a
week before the election left no doubt of the action proposed.”).
137 BCRA, 2 U.S.C. § 434(3)(A)(ii) (Supp. V 2005).
138 Briffault, Issue Advocacy, supra note 27, at 1757-59.
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C. The Burden of Regulation
In addition to recognizing that issue ads can be the “functional
equivalent” of express advocacy ads once the electoral context is
taken into account, McConnell gave relatively short shrift to the
burden that BCRA’s regulation places on corporate and union
communications.139 BCRA prohibits the use of corporate and
union treasury funds to electioneer in support of or against
federal candidates.140 Under McConnell, that need not seriously
affect non-electoral corporate and union broadcasts even if the
statutory definition reaches ads that combine references to
candidates with discussions of issues.141 A corporation or a union
could use treasury funds without running afoul of BCRA “by
simply avoiding any specific reference to federal candidates,” and
a corporate or union sponsor could air ads that mention both
candidates and issues “by paying for the ad from a segregated
A
fund,” that is, a political action committee (PAC).142
corporation or union can establish a PAC and enable it to solicit
funds from persons affiliated with the corporation or union, such
as officers, shareholders, or members.143 The parent corporation
or union can then direct the PAC to spend those voluntarily
donated funds on ads supporting or opposing candidates.144 “The
ability to form and administer [PACs] . . . has provided
corporations and unions with a constitutionally sufficient
opportunity to engage in” electoral activity.145 In other words,
McConnell treated BCRA more as a channeling mechanism –
true issue ads to be paid for by treasury funds, campaign ads to
be paid for by PACs financed by voluntary contributions – than
as a prohibition.
The Court had taken a similar view of the relationship between
corporate treasury spending and PAC activity in earlier cases. In
Federal Election Commission v. Beaumont, for example, the
Court stated that it is “simply wrong” to characterize the
statutory prohibition on corporate donations to federal
McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 206 (2003).
Id. at 204; 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
141 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 202-09.
142 Id.
143 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2)(C).
144 See, e.g., Pipefitters Local Union No. 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385,
426 (1972) (discussing the ability of unions to establish and administer PACs,
solicit contributions, and also determine the disposition of monies raised).
145 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 203.
139
140
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candidates as “a complete ban.”146 Rather, the Court observed, a
corporation or union can engage in electoral activity through its
PAC.147 “The PAC option allows corporate political participation
without the temptation to use corporate funds for political
influence, quite possibly at odds with the sentiments of some
shareholders or members.”148
Similarly, in upholding the
prohibition on corporate campaign expenditures, the Austin
Court agreed that such a restriction is not an “absolute ban on all
forms of corporate political spending” because it “permits
corporations to make independent political expenditures through
separate segregated funds.”149
WRTL II dismissed the Austin-Beaumont-McConnell view of
the law as not a ban but a mere channeling of corporate and
union participation through funds voluntarily donated to PACs.
Chief Justice Roberts repeatedly referred to the BCRA provision
“censoring” WRTL’s
as “suppressing” campaign speech,150
151
speech, or as a “ban on campaign speech.”152 In his view, the
ability of a corporation or union to use a PAC to pay for campaign
ads does not ameliorate BCRA § 203’s effect as “PACs impose
well-documented and onerous burdens, particularly on small
nonprofits.”153
The Chief Justice dismissed McConnell’s
determination that PACs provide corporations and unions “with
a constitutionally sufficient opportunity” to electioneer by noting
that McConnell was limited to express advocacy and its
functional equivalents, thus tying WRTL II’s burden analysis to
its crabbed linguistic definition of functional equivalence.154 The
Chief Justice’s opinion similarly rejected McConnell’s position
that a corporation or union could escape BCRA by refraining
from mentioning a candidate in its ad — a position it ascribed
solely to Justice Souter’s dissent without acknowledging it had
Fed. Election Comm’n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 162 (2003).
Id. at 162-63.
148 Id. at 163.
149 Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990)
(discussing section 54(1) of the Michigan Campaign Finance Act, which is
modeled on § 441(b) of the Federal Election Campaign Act).
150 WRTL II, 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2659, 2669, 2671 (2007).
151 Id. at 2669, 2674 (“[W]e give the benefit of the doubt to speech, not
censorship.”).
152 Id. at 2673.
153 Id. at 2671 n.9. But see id. at 2697 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that
WRTL did have a PAC which it had used in two prior elections to fund
independent expenditures against Senator Feingold).
154 Id. at 2671 n.9.
146
147
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been the view of the McConnell majority155 — because of the
“‘fundamental rule of protection under the First Amendment’”
that a speaker ought to be free to determine the content of its
own messages.156
The Chief Justice’s position is not unprecedented. Two decades
ago, in Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens
for Life, Inc. (MCFL), the Court similarly expressed the concern
that forcing a corporation to participate politically through a PAC
rather than with its treasury funds involves regulatory and
administrative costs that can burden a corporation’s
constitutional rights.157 In the years since MCFL, however, the
Court had minimized the burden of requiring a corporation or
union to use the PAC.158 Indeed, the Court had closely linked the
PAC requirement to the dangers posed by corporate or union
spending — that is, the “distortion caused by corporate spending”
due to resources that reflect corporate success in the economic
marketplace and not popular support for the corporation’s
electoral positions — and the concern that the use of treasury
funds is unfair to shareholders or union members who dissent
from the corporation’s or union’s electoral preferences.159 Use of
the PAC assures that corporate and union campaign spending
reflects the voluntary support of officers and shareholders, or
members, for the corporation’s or union’s political agenda.160 As I
will suggest in Part IV, Chief Justice Roberts’ return to the older
view of the PAC as a burden rather than a solution may have
implications for the underlying issue of the constitutionality of
the ban on the use of treasury funds for campaign contributions
and expenditures.
WRTL II, 127 S. Ct. at 2671 n.9.
Id. (quoting Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group
of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 573 (1995)).
157 Fed. Election Comm’n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 252
(1986); see also id. at 266 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (discussing that the burden
comes from the organizational restraints that the Act imposes).
158 See Fed. Election Comm’n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 163 (2003)
(holding that regulatory burdens do not render a PAC unconstitutional).
159 Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 665-66
(1990); see also Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 154 (discussing how the ban furthers the
duty to protect the individuals who have contributed money from supporting
candidates they oppose).
160 See McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 204 (2003)
(stating that the PAC option permits “‘corporate political participation’” while
also permitting the government to regulate campaign activity, without
“‘jeopardizing the associational rights of advocacy organizations’ members.’”)
(quoting Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 163).
155
156
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D. The Values at Stake in Campaign Finance Regulation
Finally, and most significantly, WRTL II broke with McConnell
on the fundamental question of what is at stake in campaign
finance regulation. McConnell saw campaign finance as not
simply placing burdens on First Amendment freedoms but also
as protecting the integrity of the electoral process and promoting
public faith in democracy.161 As Justice Breyer had previously
explained, campaign finance law involves not one set of
principles but the reconciliation of “competing constitutional
[values].”162 Campaign finance laws are not, or not only, speechimpairing but also democracy-promoting.
Among the
consequences of McConnell’s “democracy-centered perspective”
was a willingness to accept some burdens on political speech and
association in exchange for measures that promote other
democratic values,163 “proper deference to Congress’ ability to
weigh competing constitutional interests in an area in which it
enjoys particular expertise,”164 and a willingness, born of the
Court’s recognition of the ability of politicians and interest
groups to evade salutary restrictions, to let Congress regulate
broadly to prevent such “circumvention of regulations” and to
assure the effectiveness of measures intended “to protect the
integrity of the political process.”165
That sense of campaign finance law as the balancing of
competing democratic values, with effectiveness in preventing
corruption and promoting political integrity counting as much as
freedom of political participation, largely drops out of WRTL II.
The lead opinion framed the case entirely from a First
Amendment perspective; it was not about the rules governing the
corporate role in financing elections but simply “about political
speech.”166 What the Court in McConnell saw as the potential for
the corporate abuse of economic resources in the electoral
marketplace, Chief Justice Roberts portrayed as merely a
“[d]iscussion of . . . issues [which] may also be pertinent in an
Id. at 136-37.
Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 402-03 (2000) (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
163 Richard Briffault, McConnell v. FEC and the Transformation of
Campaign Finance Law, 3 ELECTION L.J. 147, 149, 174 (2004) [hereinafter
Briffault, McConnell v. FEC].
164 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 137.
165 Id.
166 WRTL II, 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2673 (2007).
161
162
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election.”167 When campaign finance regulation is seen solely
through the prism of the First Amendment, all regulation looks
like “censorship” or speech “suppression.” Instead of trying to
weigh and balance competing legitimate considerations going
into financing democratic elections, or respecting Congress’s
efforts to do so, the Court’s primary duty is to free speech.
Indeed, the Chief Justice drove home that point by making it
twice: “The First Amendment’s command . . . demands” that “the
benefit of the doubt” goes to “speech, not censorship,”168 and even
more sharply, “[w]here the First Amendment is implicated, the
tie goes to the speaker, not the censor.”169
The Chief Justice was particularly dismissive of the anticircumvention justification for regulation, which had loomed
large in McConnell and other cases earlier in the decade.170
McConnell’s greater attention to electoral context and political
practice included a recognition that politicians, donors, and
interest groups often found ways around FECA’s requirements
and restrictions, so that in order to effectively achieve campaign
finance’s constitutionally substantial goals Congress could
regulate more broadly to deal with such circumvention.171 But to
Chief
Justice
Roberts,
restriction
of
electioneering
communication in order to prevent circumvention of the
restriction on express advocacy smacked of a “prophylaxis-uponprophylaxis approach to regulating expression [that] is not
consistent with strict scrutiny” required by the First
Amendment.172
To be sure, the Chief Justice did not reject campaign finance
regulation altogether. His opinion cited largely without comment
the justifications previously accepted by the Court for campaign
Id. at 2669.
Id. at 2667, 2674.
169 Id. at 2669.
170 Briffault, McConnell v. FEC, supra note 163, at 148, 152-54; Fed.
Election Comm’n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 155-56 (2003) (discussing how
regulation is meant to curb corruption); Colorado Republican II, 533 U.S. 431,
456-57 (2001) (discussing the importance of government regulation of
contribution limits, and in particular the prominence of circumvention as a
justification).
171 See McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 223-24 (2003)
(observing the notion that “‘[t]o say that Congress is without power to pass
appropriate legislation to safeguard . . . an election from the improper use of
money to influence the result is to deny to the nation in a vital particular the
power of self protection.’”) (citing Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 545
(1934)).
172 WRTL II, 127 S. Ct. at 2672.
167
168
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finance restrictions.173 He did not question any campaign finance
law or any campaign holding of the Court. Indeed, he was
careful to avoid formally invalidating the electioneering
communication provision. But he gave the impression that in his
view the First Amendment was already strained by existing
campaign finance rules and could not be stretched further to
reach most electioneering communications.174 Or, as he put it in
his pithiest phrase, “[e]nough is enough.”175
The First Amendment focus was also, unsurprisingly, central
to Justice Scalia’s concurrence. In asserting the primacy of the
First Amendment to campaign finance doctrine, however, Justice
Scalia was perhaps more candid than the lead opinion in
acknowledging the existence of a tension between the WRTL II
majority’s approach and the needs of democratic elections.
Quoting a statement of former House Minority Leader Richard
Gephardt that “‘freedom of speech and our desire for healthy
campaigns in a healthy democracy’” are “‘in direct conflict,’”176
Justice Scalia observed that Gephardt “may well be correct” but
that whether or not Gephardt is right, “it is pretty clear which
side of the equation this institution is primarily responsible for.
It is perhaps our most important constitutional task to assure
freedom of political speech.”177 In putting the commitment to the
primacy of the First Amendment in terms of the Court’s
particular institutional role, Justice Scalia is, of course, too
modest.
Given the Court’s control over constitutional
interpretation and its power to invalidate federal and state
legislation it finds unconstitutional, the WRTL II Court’s
commitment to the primacy of the First Amendment, unbalanced
by other democratic values, will constrain and displace the
decisions of Congress, the fifty state legislatures, voter
initiatives, and the multiple elected local governments that
might otherwise choose to reconcile these competing visions of
democracy differently.
173

See id. at 2672-73 (referring to reasoning from Buckley, McConnell, and

Austin).
174 Id. at 2672 (“But to justify regulation of WRTL’s ads, this interest must
be stretched yet another step to ads that are not the functional equivalent of
express advocacy.”) (emphasis in original).
175 Id.
176 Id. at 2686 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (quoting Nancy Gibbs, The Wake-Up Call, TIME, Feb. 3, 1997, at 22,
25).
177 Id. (emphasis in original).
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III. LOOKING FORWARD: CAMPAIGN FINANCE REGULATION AFTER
WRTL II
Following WRTL I and Randall, WRTL II makes it clearer
than ever that the Court has left behind the period at the start of
the decade in which it regularly deferred to federal and state
campaign finance regulations,178 and has entered an era in which
campaign finance rules will receive close and skeptical scrutiny.
Moreover, as the capacious as-applied exception to BCRA § 203
indicates, a majority of the Court is prepared not simply to reject
new laws,179 but at the very least to open loopholes in previouslyapproved laws, even if not to invalidate such laws outright. The
division within the majority over whether to overturn a past
precedent or, instead, to read it as narrowly as possible, with the
implication that the Chief Justice and Justice Alito are reluctant
to break formally with past decisions, however, makes it
particularly difficult to determine the broader implications of
WRTL II for the future of campaign finance doctrine. The
“music” of the case is surely hostile to campaign finance
regulation, but the “words” were carefully limited to the
particular issue at hand.
Nonetheless, WRTL II raises three questions almost
immediately. First, in BCRA, Congress used the “electioneering
communication” definition parsed in WRTL II not only to extend
corporate and union speech restrictions but also, in § 201, to
expand the scope of disclosure.180
McConnell upheld that

178 See
Richard L. Hasen, Rethinking the Unconstitutionality of
Contribution and Expenditure Limits in Ballot Measure Campaigns, 78 S. CAL.
L. REV. 885, 886 (2005) (referring collectively to McConnell, Nixon, Colorado
Republican II, and Beaumont as the cases exhibiting such deference). Writing
at the time not long ago when these cases were exemplars of the Court’s
approach, Rick Hasen referred to them as the “New Deference Quartet.” Id.
179 See Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479, 2500 (2006) (rejecting Vermont’s
expenditure limits and very low contribution limits because they violate the
First Amendment).
180 BCRA, 2 U.S.C § 434(f)(4) (Supp. V 2005).
[T]he term ‘disclosure date’ means—
(A) the first date during any calendar year by which a person has made
disbursements for the direct costs of producing or airing electioneering
communications aggregating in excess of $10,000; and
(B) any other date during such calendar year by which a person has
made disbursements for the direct costs of producing or airing
electioneering communications aggregating in excess of $10,000 . . . .
Id. (emphasis added).
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provision.181 Does WRTL II undermine that holding? Second,
McConnell also upheld BCRA’s curbs on political party soft
money, including, the issue ads of political parties.182 Does
WRTL II affect the scope, or constitutionality, of the ban on softmoney funding of party issue ads, or of the soft money
restrictions more broadly? Third, both McConnell and WRTL II
dealt with the extension of the longstanding ban on the use of
corporate and union treasury funds to issue ads.183 Does WRTL
II affect the constitutionality of the underlying ban? It is not
possible to answer any of these questions with certainty. Some
preliminary speculation may be in order.
A. Disclosure
BCRA’s definition of “electioneering communication” enlarges
the sphere of mandatory reporting and disclosure.184 BCRA § 201
requires that any person who makes disbursements totaling
more than $10,000 in a calendar year for the direct cost of
producing and airing electioneering communication to file a
report with the FEC within twenty-four hours of the expenditure
exceeding $10,000.185 In addition, if the expenditure is made by a
corporate or union PAC or by an individual who has collected
contributions from others, the disclosure must identify those who
contributed $1,000 or more.186 McConnell upheld this enhanced
disclosure requirement by a vote of 8-1, as even Justices Scalia

McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 199 (2003).
Id. at 161.
183 See id. at 203-04; WRTL II, 127 S. Ct. 2660.
184 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A)(i).
The term ‘electioneering communication’ means any broadcast, cable, or
satellite communication which—
(I) refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office;
(II) is made within—
(aa) 60 days before a general, special, or runoff election for the office
sought by the candidate; or
(bb) 30 days before a primary or preference election, or a convention or
caucus of a political party that has authority to nominate a candidate,
for the office sought by the candidate; and
(III) in the case of a communication which refers to a candidate for an
office other than President or Vice President, is targeted to the relevant
electorate.
Id.
185 Id. § 434(f)(1).
186 Id. § 434(f)(2)(E), (F); McConnell, 540 U.S. at 194-95.
181
182
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and Kennedy and then-Chief Justice Rehnquist, who all voted to
strike down most of BCRA’s provisions, agreed that this measure
extending disclosure to some forms of issue advocacy advertising
was constitutional.187
Given that it relies on the exact same term – “electioneering
communication” – that was at stake in WRTL II, it would appear
that BCRA’s disclosure provision is ripe for the claim that it too
is subject to a capacious as-applied exception. It would hardly be
surprising if, fresh from its Supreme Court victory, WRTL were
to seek an as-applied exception for disclosure of its issue ad
expenditures of the large donors to its issue ad campaigns. By
denying donors’ anonymity, and compelling politically active
groups to incur the costs of collecting and reporting information
to the government, disclosure burdens constitutional rights of
political speech and association.188 Buckley articulated and
applied the express advocacy standard in the context of the
constitutional concerns implicated by FECA’s disclosure
requirement.189 One might think that if it is constitutional to
regulate only the “functional equivalent” of express advocacy,
and in the context of corporate and union treasury expenditures
“functional equivalent” now means “no reasonable interpretation”
as anything other than a call to vote for or against a candidate
without regard to the timing or context in which the ad is aired,
then it ought to mean the same thing in the disclosure context, so
that most issue ads would now be exempt from BCRA’s
disclosure requirement, as well.
However, that might not necessarily be the case. Consistent
with the Court’s disclosure jurisprudence, McConnell already
provided an as-applied exception to the disclosure requirement
for individuals or groups for whom the loss of anonymity would
produce a serious risk of harm or reprisal.190 Although disclosure
does impose administrative obligations on campaign ad sponsors,

187 See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 321 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part with respect to BCRA Titles I and II)
(stating that since the regulation substantially relates to other interests, the
regulation is constitutional).
188 See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995)
(finding that, although anonymous pamphleteering might shield those who
intend to commit fraud, an Ohio statute seeking to prevent misuse of
anonymous election-related speech is unconstitutional because it interferes
with “an honorable tradition of advocacy and dissent”).
189 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 80 (1976) (per curiam).
190 See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 199.
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those burdens are surely less onerous than the prohibition on the
expenditure of corporate or union treasury funds. Whereas the
WRTL II majority considered the application of the
electioneering communication definition to corporate and union
spending to be a speech “ban,” and a form of “censorship,”191
“disclosure requirements are constitutional because they ‘d[o] not
prevent anyone from speaking.’”192 As Justice Kennedy, joined by
Justice Scalia and the late Chief Justice Rehnquist,
acknowledged in McConnell, the BCRA provision “does
substantially relate” to the interest in providing the electorate
with information which the Court has regularly relied upon to
uphold disclosure requirements.193 Moreover, the justices who
joined Justice Scalia’s WRTL II concurrence were sharply critical
of the vagueness and uncertainty of Chief Justice Roberts’s
“functional equivalent of express advocacy” standard,194 so it is
doubtful there is a majority to apply that standard to BCRA’s
disclosure requirement.
Thus,
although
BCRA
applies
the
“electioneering
communication” term to two types of regulations, it is not at all
clear that the same type of as-applied exception will be available
in both settings. Pragmatically, given McConnell’s 8-1 vote to
uphold § 201, BCRA’s enhanced disclosure is likely to be safe
from the Court’s reconsideration of its facial validity. As a result,
it is quite possible that the Constitution will be held to permit
one application of “electioneering communication” for one set of
regulations, but a different application of the very same term for
a different set of regulations.

B. The “Public Communications” of State and Local Political
Parties
In addition to addressing the proliferation of electioneering ads
that took the form of issue advocacy advertising, BCRA also
clamped down on “soft money,”195 that is contributions to political
WRTL II, 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2669, 2673 (2007).
McConnell, 540 U.S. at 201 (quoting Brief for FEC in Opposition at 112,
McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003) (No. 02-582)).
193 Id. at 321 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part with respect to BCRA Titles I and II).
194 WRTL II, 127 S. Ct. at 2680-81 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
195 BCRA, 2 U.S.C. § 441i(a)(1) (Supp. V 2005) (“A national committee of a
191
192
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parties in excess of the dollar limits on individual donations and
in violation of the ban on corporate and union contributions, and
McConnell upheld that ban.196 One reason for the explosive
growth of party soft money in the 1990s was that the parties
discovered, and the FEC agreed, that soft money could be used to
pay for advertising concerning federal candidates as long as
those ads avoided the magic words of express advocacy.197 BCRA
addressed the soft money problem by, first, barring the national
political parties from soliciting, accepting, or using any funds
other than those that comply with FECA’s dollar limitations and
source prohibitions.198 Second, to deal with the likelihood that
big donors and the parties would seek to circumvent the
restriction on the national parties, BCRA also prohibited state
and local political parties from using soft money for a defined set
of
“federal
election
activities”
including
“public
communication,”199 which was further defined as any
communication that “refers to a clearly identified candidate for
Federal office” and that “promotes,” “attacks,” “supports” or
“opposes” (“PASO”) that candidate.200
“Public communication” is, thus, the political party counterpart
to “electioneering communication” and was part of Congress’s
broader effort to redraw the elections/politics line. As McConnell
observed, “[s]uch ads were a prime motivating force behind
BCRA’s passage.”201 The “public communication” definition is
considerably broader than the “electioneering communication”
standard applied to pre-election disclosure and to the corporate
and union spending restriction. It is neither limited to broadcast
media, nor to the pre-election period. On the other hand, the
PASO requirement does condition regulation on some linguistic
terms that signal an effort to help or hurt a candidate; mere
mention of a clearly identified candidate, even within the preelection period, would not suffice.202
political party . . . may not solicit, receive, or direct to another person a
contribution, donation, or transfer of funds or any other thing of value, or spend
any funds, that are not subject to the limitations, prohibitions, and reporting
requirements of this Act.”).
196 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 188-89.
197 Id. at 123-24; Briffault, McConnell v. FEC, supra note 163, at 153.
198 Briffault, McConnell v. FEC, supra note 163, at 150.
199 Id.
200 2 U.S.C. § 431(20)(A)(iii).
201 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 169.
202 See 2 U.S.C. § 431(20)(A)(iii) (stating that the mere mention of a
candidate would not be enough, but would have to be accompanied by an effort
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McConnell had little difficulty finding that the PASO standard
was not overly broad.203 Expenditures that support or attack a
candidate “directly affect[] the election in which he is
participating,” with the “overwhelming tendency . . . to benefit
directly federal candidates.”204
With that benefit, federal
officeholders would likely be “grateful” for the state and local
party public communications and for the contributions that made
such public communications possible, thus raising the danger
that the officeholder beneficiaries would feel beholden to the soft
money donors.205 The extension of contribution restrictions to the
federal election activities of state and local political parties,
including such public communications, was found to be “closely
drawn to the anticorruption interest it is intended to address.”206
Nor did the law raise a vagueness question.207 Rather, it
“clearly set forth the confines within which potential party
speakers must act in order to avoid triggering the provision.”208
This was “particularly” so “since actions taken by political parties
are presumed to be in connection with election campaigns.”209
Does WRTL II’s limitation of “electioneering communication”
as the functional equivalent of express advocacy affect BCRA’s
requirement that the “public communications” of state and local
political parties be funded only by hard money? Arguably, PASO
statements, which by definition include praise or criticism of
candidates, are the functional equivalent of express advocacy.
Unlike WRTL’s ads, such a party communication “take[s] a
position on a candidate’s character, qualifications, or fitness for
office.”210 On the other hand, one can imagine a party taking out
an ad that discusses a matter which is both a legislative and a
campaign issue and criticizes the position of the incumbent, who
also happens to be the opposing candidate. Such an ad might not
be “susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than as an
appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate,”211 as it could be

to “promote, support, attack or oppose” that opponent in order to qualify as a
“federal election activity”).
203 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 170.
204 Id.
205 Id. at 145, 168.
206 Id. at 170.
207 Id. at 170 n.64.
208 Id.
209 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 170 n.64.
210 WRTL II, 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2667 (2007).
211 Id.
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argued that such an ad is intended to influence the incumbent’s
legislative position. Nor is it clear that the Court would still
accept the McConnell conclusion that the First Amendment’s
strict scrutiny requirement would be satisfied by the
presumption that party ads that pass the PASO test are
electioneering.
More generally, WRTL II’s criticism of the anti-circumvention
rationale could raise new questions concerning the justification
for the restrictions on soft money. BCRA’s soft money provisions
are essentially anti-circumvention measures. BCRA bars soft
money donations to the national parties to avoid circumvention of
the rules on donations to candidates, and it restricts soft money
donations to the state and local parties to avoid circumvention of
the ban on soft money donations to the national parties.212 The
McConnell majority found that these measures were justified by
the dangers soft money posed for the integrity of the political
process.213 But, the four McConnell dissenters countered that
Congress had not mustered the evidence the First Amendment
requires to demonstrate that contributions to political parties so
raise the danger of the corruption of officeholders as to justify
BCRA’s broad restriction.214 They would have rejected the total
ban on soft money donations to the national parties so that, a
fortiori, the anti-circumvention rationale did not for them justify
restrictions on soft money donations to state and local parties, or
their use to pay for “public communications.”215
Given Chief Justice Roberts’s “enough is enough” rhetoric, the
anti-circumvention rationale as a justification for the regulation
of soft money may be at risk. Moreover, the Court’s shift in
perspective, from striving to balance free speech and the
protection of governmental integrity to a more strongly FirstAmendment-centric approach, may mean that there is a majority
on the Court that is more sensitive to the McConnell dissent’s
claim that more proof is needed before soft money can be deemed
to be corrupting.
Of course, it would be premature to say that BCRA’s soft
money proscriptions, whether on state and local party public

McConnell, 540 U.S. at 143, 161.
Id. at 143, 164-65.
214 Id. at 298 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part with respect to BCRA Titles I and II, joined by the late Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas).
215 Id. at 303-04.
212
213
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communications or more broadly, are at risk. Unlike the
electioneering communication provision at issue in WRTL II, the
soft money rules technically are contribution restrictions – aimed
at enforcing the dollar limits on individual donors and the
prohibitions on corporate and union contributions – not
expenditure limitations. And, since Buckley, the Court has been
far more deferential to contribution controls than expenditure
restraints.
Nor is it clear that there is an opportunity to use an “asapplied” exception to undermine the limits. McConnell flatly
held that “the Government’s strong interests in preventing
corruption, and in particular the appearance of corruption, are
thus sufficient to justify subjecting all donations to national
parties to the source, amount, and disclosure limitations of
FECA.”216 Although McConnell applied the limit on soft money
funding of state and local party federal election activities only on
its face,217 the Court indicated that an “as-applied” challenge
would be available only if a party could show that the limit is so
constraining that it impairs the party’s ability to engage in
effective advocacy.218
In practice, the soft money limits have not been nearly as
burdensome to party election activities as critics had predicted.
Indeed, in 2004, the major political parties raised more in hard
money than in hard and soft money combined in the prior
presidential election.219 The growing role of the Internet in
reducing the costs of fundraising may mitigate the loss of big soft
money donors still further. In the absence of a showing of an
impact on party capacity to raise enough money to participate
effectively in an election, any effort to undo the soft money ban
would require a head-on reconsideration of McConnell. Chief
Justice Roberts’s and Justice Alito’s hesitation to overrule
McConnell in WRTL II suggests that even if a majority of the
Court would have invalidated the soft money restrictions had
they seen them for the first time, there may not be a majority
ready for such a dramatic move right now.

Id. at 156 (emphasis added).
Id. at 173.
218 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 173.
219 Anthony Corrado, Party Finance in the Wake of BCRA: An Overview, in
THE ELECTION AFTER REFORM: MONEY, POLITICS, AND THE BIPARTISAN CAMPAIGN
REFORM ACT 19, 25 (Michael J. Malbin ed., 2006).
216
217
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C. The Corporate and Union Treasury Fund Restriction
In McConnell, the four dissenters to the Court’s upholding of
BCRA § 203 focused little attention on the definition of
electioneering communication per se or on the reasons for
expanding the prohibition.220 Instead, they aimed their fire on
the underlying rule itself and called for the overruling of the
1990 Austin decision which had upheld a state corporate
spending prohibition.221 McConnell was thus as much a 5-4
decision on the corporate and union spending ban as on the scope
of constitutionally regulable campaign speech.222 In WRTL II,
the three McConnell dissenters who were still on the Court
reiterated their call to overrule Austin.223
Although our oldest federal campaign finance law – the
Tillman Act of 1907224 – imposed special restrictions on
corporations, and the corporate and union spending ban dates to
1947,225 this spending prohibition sits uneasily with the Court’s
general hostility towards expenditure limitations. Neither does
it coincide with the 1978 Bellotti decision, which struck down a
state law limiting corporate spending in a ballot proposition
election.226 Moreover, Chief Justice Roberts’s WRTL II opinion,
by repeatedly referring to BCRA’s electioneering communication
provision as either a “ban,” “censorship,” or the “suppression” of
speech, called into question McConnell’s treatment of the
220 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 322-41 passim (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part with respect to BCRA Titles I and II,
joined by the late Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas).
221 Id. at 322-23.
222 Id.
223 WRTL II, 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2679 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring, joined by
Justices Kennedy and Thomas).
224 Tillman Act, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864 (1907) (codified and incorporated in
scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.); see Fed. Election Comm’n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S.
146, 152-53 (2003) (noting that the Tillman Act was the first federal campaign
finance law).
225 Labor-Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 1947, Pub. L. No. 80120, § 304, 61 Stat. 159 (1948) (codified and incorporated in scattered sections of
2 U.S.C.).
226 First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 795 (1978). Austin
is not completely an outlier either. Other post-Buckley cases have upheld
federal laws imposing tighter restrictions on corporations and unions than on
other campaign actors. See, e.g., Fed. Election Comm’n v. Nat’l Right to Work
Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 210-11 (1982) (holding that unions, corporations, and
similar organizations should be treated differently than individuals); see also
Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 159 (distinguishing between “advocacy corporations” and
“traditional business corporations”).
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underlying expenditure restriction as a mere channeling device,
requiring corporations and unions to participate in elections
through PACs rather than use their treasury funds. The lead
opinion’s analysis, thus, serves to emphasize the burden on
speech that the restriction on corporate and union treasury funds
creates.227 Moreover, the opinion’s general emphasis on the
importance of viewing campaign finance restrictions solely
through the prism of the First Amendment provides further basis
for wondering whether Austin might be ripe for reconsideration.
On the other hand, the lead opinion also treated Austin as
governing, and never called it into question.228 Indeed, the lead
opinion carefully argued that the expansive as-applied exception
to § 203 was actually required by Austin and Austin’s distinction
of Bellotti’s invalidation of corporate political expenditure
restrictions outside the candidate-election setting.229
The
opinion’s treatment of Austin suggests that these justices accept
Austin, even though they are loathe to expand its reach. Though,
to be sure, there is nothing in the WRTL II lead opinion that
directly supports Austin either.
Of course, there may be no need for the Court to actually
reconsider Austin; WRTL II may have done the necessary work.
With the corporate and union expenditure restrictions now
turned back to the “functional equivalent” of express advocacy,
the restrictions are unlikely to have much bite. As the record in
the years leading up to BCRA demonstrated, corporations and
unions had little difficulty deploying effective campaign ads that
did not involve the use of literal, express advocacy. It is unlikely
those skills atrophied in the three and a half years between
McConnell and WRTL II. Corporations and unions that want to
spend money in support of or in opposition to federal candidates
are likely to be able to do so even if Austin remains good law.
WRTL II’s as-applied exception to the electioneering
communication provision effectively creates a capacious
exception to the general restriction on corporate and union
treasury funds as well.
*****

227 See WRTL II, 127 S. Ct. at 2673 (referring to Austin as a “ban on
campaign speech”).
228 Id. at 2672-73.
229 Id.
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As these speculations suggest, the immediate doctrinal
consequences of WRTL II are difficult to predict. They may not
necessarily be large, especially for campaign finance issues that
have already been settled.230 What WRTL II most obviously does
is heighten the uncertainty in what is already a complex field
marked by fine distinctions, uneasily consistent rulings, and
cases pointing in different directions.
Campaign finance law establishes the rules of the game for
how we pay for our elections. For many decades legislators,
judges, politicians, and academics have struggled over how those
rules ought to accommodate multiple competing concerns –
freedom of speech and association, political equality, electoral
competitiveness, and controlling the undue influence of money on
the political process. Compromise, arbitrary line-drawing, and
dissatisfaction with the content of the rules in place are
inevitable, but there is consensus that whatever rules are
adopted ought to be clear and stable with predictable
consequences for campaign participants. Reasonable people can
disagree over whether WRTL II’s decision to cut back on
regulatory control over corporate and union campaign spending
substantively improves the law. But it is hard to avoid the
conclusion that this sharp swerve in doctrine, the lead opinion’s
failure to acknowledge the inconsistency between its analysis and
holding and McConnell’s, the vagueness of the lead opinion’s test,
and the uncertainty of its implications for the rest of BCRA and
for campaign finance law more broadly are anything but setbacks
for the vital rule of law values of clarity, stability, and
predictability.

230 There may, of course, be consequences for developing areas of the law.
Some public funding systems, for example, contain measures providing
additional funds to publicly funded candidates if they are opposed by high
spending privately funded candidates or if they are targeted by independent
expenditures. See, e.g., Jason B. Frasco, Full Public Funding: An Effective and
Legally Viable Model for Campaign Finance Reform in the States, 92 CORNELL
L. REV. 733, 771-76 (2007) (discussing the “rescue fund” component of North
Carolina’s judicial election public funding program). I owe this point to an
observation by Roy Schotland.

